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Abstract
This paper explains why payment card networks charge fees that are proportional
to the transaction values instead of charging ﬁxed per-transaction fees. We show
that, when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks
earn higher proﬁts by charging proportional fees. It is also shown that competition
among merchants reduces card networks’ gains from using proportional fees relative
to ﬁxed per-transaction fees. Merchants are found to earn lower proﬁts under pro-
portional fees whereas consumer utility and social welfare are higher. Our welfare
results are then evaluated with respect to the current regulatory policy debates.
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Credit and debit cards have become an important part of our payment system and they
aﬀect a large portion of the consumer and merchant populations. Recent Federal Reserve
studies found that 80.2% of the U.S. consumers have debit cards and 78.3% have credit
cards. In a typical month, 31.0% of consumer payments are paid for with debit cards,
and 21.3% with credit cards (Foster et al., 2009). In 2006, debit cards were used in 25.3
billion transactions for a total value of $1.0 trillion, and credit cards were used in 21.7
billion transactions for a total value of $2.1 trillion (Gerdes, 2008).
Along with this development, some controversy has emerged because merchants are
critical of the card fees, challenging both the fee structure and the level.1 This has
generated heated debates among researchers, practitioners and policymakers in recent
years. On the research side, a large body of literature, called “two-sided market theory,”
has been developed to evaluate payment card market competition and pricing issues.2 On
the policy side, three bills are currently under consideration in Congress. If passed, the
new legislation could open the possibility of regulating card fees in the United States.
Similar trends are also taking place in many other countries. More than 20 countries and
areas around the world have started regulating or investigating card fees.3
There are several main issues at the heart of the card fee controversy. For example,
should card issuers be allowed to collectively set merchant (interchange) fees? How do the
resulting fee levels correspond to social optimum? Why are these fees proportional to the
transaction values rather than ﬁxed per-transaction fees? While the academic literature
1Recently, there have been more than 50 lawsuits ﬁled by merchants and merchant associations against
card networks and card issuers regarding merchant card fees. Many of the recent lawsuits have been
consolidated in an ongoing case before the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of New York.
2For example, Baxter (1983), Katz (2001), Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003), Gans
and King (2003), Wright (2003, 2004), Schwartz and Vincent (2006), McAndrews and Wang (2008),
Rysman (2009) and Wang (2010a, 2010b).
3The countries and areas that have taken actions on merchant (interchange) fees include Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, European Union, France, Israel, Mexico, Norway,
Panama, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. Other countries that have
started investigating merchant (interchange) fees include Brazil, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, South
Africa and United Kingdom (Bradford and Hayashi, 2008).
1has so far focused on the collective setting and level of merchant (interchange) fees, this
paper solves the puzzle why card networks charge proportional fees.
There are four types of general purpose payment cards in the United States: Credit
cards, charge cards, signature debit cards and PIN debit cards. Charge cards are similar
to credit cards, except that they require cardholders to pay oﬀ full charges every month.
Signature debit cards and PIN debit cards do not extend credit to cardholders. Instead,
they debit the cardholder’s bank account right after each transaction.4 The ﬁrst three
types of cards are routed over the credit card networks and charge fees that are propor-
tional to the transaction values.5 In contrast, PIN debit cards are routed over the PIN
debit networks, which used to charge ﬁxed per-transaction fees. However, in recent years,
PIN debit cards have been shifting to the proportional fee model, though typically with
ac a p . 6
Figure 1 shows the average total fees that merchants pay for accepting various payment
cards. These fees are often referred to as the “merchant discount,” and a large portion
of the merchant discount comes from interchange fees, paid by merchants to card issuers
through merchant acquirers. The fees for credit card transactions are the highest, followed
by the fees for signature debit cards and PIN debit cards. On average, merchants pay
about 1.75-2.41% of the transaction value for accepting signature debit cards and credit
cards, and 0.62% for accepting PIN debit cards. These fees generate signiﬁcant revenue
for card service providers. In 2008, U.S. merchants paid $60.9 billion in merchant discount
4Debit card payments are typically authorized either with a PIN or by the cardholder’s signature. In
terms of transaction volume, signature debit cards account for 60 percent of debit transactions, and PIN
debit cards account for 40 percent.
5Visa and MasterCard are the two major credit card networks in the United States. They provide
card services through member ﬁnancial institutions (card issuers and merchant acquirers), and account
for 80 percent U.S. credit card market share. These two networks are also the sole providers of signature
debit cards, with Visa holding 75 percent market share and MasterCard holding 25 percent.
6There are 14 major PIN debit networks in the United States. The proportional fees on PIN debit
transactions started in 1996 by Interlink for non-supermarket transactions. Star and NYCE followed
suit in 2000. Exchange started using proportional fees in 2002, Maestro in 2003, and Pulse and Jeanie
in 2005. Major PIN debit cards currently charge between 0.45 to 0.75 percent of the transaction value
plus 5 to 15 cents, capped around 40 to 65 cents for non-supermarket transactions. More recently, some
leading networks removed “caps” for small retail merchant categories, and many networks raised “capped
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Figure 1: Average merchant discount rates. Source: Hayashi (2009).
fees (Nilson Report, 2009).
Card networks have often argued that the reason why they impose proportional fees
stems from the costs they bear from processing card transactions and providing “payment
guarantee” services. However, empirical evidence suggests that the cost components can-
not explain the merchant fees commonly set at the 1-3% level for brand name cards.7
Particularly, debit cards do not provide credit ﬂoat and bear very small fraud risk, so
there appears to be no cost basis for charging proportional fees. In fact, the PIN debit
networks used to work well (some are still working) by charging ﬁxed per-transaction
fees. In many other countries, ﬁxed per-transaction fees are the norm for debit cards.8
Therefore, a natural question to ask is why U.S. card networks charge proportional fees.
In this paper we demonstrate that the “double marginalization” market structure pro-
7For example, industry studies show that the average net fraud losses to card issuers are 0.08% for
credit cards, 0.05% for signature debit cards and 0.01% for PIN debit cards.
8Several countries have already debated whether to allow proportional fees on debit transactions. Most
recently, the Canadian Senate held hearings on this issue and rejected the request of Interac, the Canadian
debit system, for charging proportional fees (See “Transparency, Balance and Choice: Canada’s Credit
Card and Debit Card Systems,” the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce,
Canada, June 2009).
3vides the major explanation for this puzzle. Viewing card markets and merchant markets
as vertically related, we ﬁnd that upstream card networks can better restrain the market
power of downstream merchants by charging proportional fees. As a result, card networks
earn higher proﬁts by charging proportional fees compared with ﬁxed per-transaction
fees. Using a simple model, we also investigate how changing the degree of competition
among merchants aﬀects card networks’ gains from proportional fees relative to ﬁxed per-
transaction fees. Finally, we investigate and compare merchant proﬁts, consumer utility
and social welfare under the two types of fees.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model of a card network,
merchants, and consumers. Section 3 solves for the proportional card fees which maximize
the proﬁt of the card network. Section 4 computes the ﬁxed per-transaction card fees.
Section 5 compares equilibrium market allocations under proportional fees and ﬁxed per-
transaction fees. Section 6 incorporates card annual fees into the analysis. Section 7
concludes with some policy discussions and other applications.
2 The Model
We study a simple model of a payment card system illustrated in Figure 2. Consumers
use a payment card to pay merchants. Merchants submit charges to a card network which
then bills consumers. For the purpose of this paper we deliberately abstract from the
internal organization of card networks which consist of merchant acquirers who receive
requests for payments from merchants, and card issuers who bill consumers and send the
money to merchant acquirers who then pay the merchants.9
2.1 Consumers
Consumers buy two types of goods. Let  denote the consumption of goods for which
consumers pay only with cash (cash goods in what follows). Let  denote the consumption
9There is no loss of generality with this simpliﬁcation because considering additional players within
card networks would further enhance card networks’ incentive to charge proportional fees.
4sells good at 
price P
(a) pays P(1+fc)
(b)   pays P+fc
(a)   pays P(1-fm)
(b)   pays P-fm
Merchant Cardholder
Card Network
Figure 2: A card system with (a) proportional fees or (b) ﬁxed per-transaction fees
of goods for which consumers pay only with cards (card goods).10 Consumers’ utility
function is assumed to take the quasi-linear form given by
 =  + 
1−,w h e r e 0 1 0 (1)
The price of card goods is denoted by . T h ep r i c eo fc a s hg o o d si sn o r m a l i z e dt o
unity. Consumers’ budget constraint is given by
 +  =  (2)
where  denotes consumers’ exogenously-given income.
Substituting (2) for  in (1), and maximizing with respect to  obtains consumers’
10We interpret cash as non-card payments which also include checks and bank transfers. Here we
implicitly assume that the cost of using cash is too high for card goods. Alternatively, we could explicitly
model consumers’ decisions regarding which payment instrument to use, but that would not aﬀect our
analysis. In fact, we may assume that each consumer has a unit demand for goods, but consumers are
heterogenous with respect to the beneﬁts they derive from using cards relative to cash. Assuming that
consumers’ beneﬁts from using cards follow a Pareto distribution would then generate the same isoelastic
demand function (3) for card goods (See Wang, 2010b).
5isoelastic demand for card goods
 = 
−,w h e r e  = (1 − ) (3)
The price consumers pay for card goods  is composed of two parts: (a) the retail
price charged by merchants, denoted by , and (b) a consumer card fee charged by the
card network denoted by . The consumer card fee could be proportional to the price or





(1 + ) under proportional fee,
 +  under ﬁxed per-transaction fee.
(4)
2.2 Merchants
There are  ≥ 1 merchants who sell card goods. Each merchant obtains the goods at a
unit cost  and sells them at a retail price . The card network charges merchants a card
fee .
Let  denote the output sold by merchant . Then, the total cost borne by each





( + ) under proportional fee,
( + ) under ﬁxed per-transaction fee.
(5)
Each merchant  sets the output level  taking the output by competing merchants
− =  −  as given, and maximizes proﬁtg i v e nb y
( )= − ( ) (6)
where  can be extracted from (3) and (4), and expressed as a function of ( −).
11Note that a ﬁxed per-transaction fee is analytically equivalent to a ﬁxed per-item fee as long as the
number of transactions is proportional to the number of items sold.
62.3 The card network and timing
T h ec a r dn e t w o r ki sa s s u m e dt oi n c u raﬁxed cost  for processing each card transaction.12





( + )−  under proportional fees,
( +  − ) under ﬁxed per-transaction fees.
(7)
The following two sections solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the following
two-stage game:
Stage I. The card network chooses card fees  and  to maximize proﬁt( 7 ) .
Stage II. Each merchant takes card fees  and  as given and chooses output level  to
maximize proﬁt (6), where in this stage output levels must satisfy the Nash-Cournot
outcome.
3 Proportional Card Fees
We ﬁrst consider proportional card fees. Notice that the equilibrium market allocation is
unique up to a combination of  and  in the two-sided card market that we consider.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we set  =0in the following analysis.13 The
consumer demand for card goods (3) becomes
 = 
− (8)
The cost borne by each merchant is already given in the top row of (5).
12This simplifying assumption suits well with debit cards, which are at the center of the controversy
regarding proportional fees versus ﬁxed per-transaction fees.
13We thank the referee for suggesting this. Note that the equalibrium market allocation is unique up
to a combination of  and  is consistent with the neutrality result found in the two-sided market
literature, e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2002), Wright (2003) and Gans and King (2003).
7In Stage II, each merchant  takes − as given and chooses output  to solve
max

 =  − ( + ) = ( + −)
−(1 − ) −  (9)
where the price  was substituted from (8).
The ﬁrst-order condition for the proﬁt maximization problem (9) yields





In a symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium all merchants sell the same amount, so that
 =  for each merchant  =1 . Therefore, the total merchant output,  = ,











( − )(1 − )
 (10)
where the superscript “pr” stands for proportional card fees. As expected, the equilibrium
price (output) increases (decreases) with the merchant card fee .
In Stage I, the card network takes the merchant equilibrium (10) as given and chooses























+ ( − )
 + ( − )
 (12)







 + ( − )




8The equilibrium price and total merchant output can be computed from (10) to be

 =
 + ( − )




 + ( − )
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 + ( − )





 + ( − )
¸
 (16)
Substituting (14) into consumers’ utility function (1) and (2) obtains the equilibrium
consumer utility















 + ( − )




Altogether, the total social welfare (deﬁned as the sum of consumer utility, merchant









 + ( − )








 + ( − )
¸
 (18)
We now investigate the eﬀects of changing the degree of competition among merchants.
Result 1. Suppose that the card network imposes proportional card fees. Then, an
increase in the number of competing merchants would
(a) increase the proﬁto ft h ec a r dn e t w o r kΠ
 ,
(b) decrease the equilibrium price  and increase total merchant output ,
(c) decrease total merchant proﬁts Π
,
(d) increase the sum of card network and merchant proﬁts Π

+,
9(e) increase consumer utility ,
(f) increase social welfare .
Proof. Equations (13)-(18) imply that Π
   0    0    0
Π
  0 Π

+  0    0 and   0.
The ﬁndings in Result 1 can be explained as follows. Although this paper investigates
a two-sided payment card market, much of the intuition can be derived from a one-sided
market analogy. The card network can be viewed as an upstream ﬁrm that charges
the downstream merchants a proportional fee  for card services. The downstream
merchants then take  as given, and sell the ﬁnal goods to consumers at price .W h e n
 =1 , both the upstream and downstream markets are monopolized, in which case
we have the classic “double marginalization” problem. As  increases, the downstream
market becomes more competitive, which mitigates the double marginalization eﬀect.
Consequently, this decreases the proﬁt of downstream merchants but increases the proﬁt
of the upstream card network. Altogether, the sum of card network and merchant proﬁts
are higher, so are consumer utility and social welfare.
4 Fixed Per-transaction Card Fees
Suppose now the card network sets ﬁxed per-transaction fees that are independent of the
price of goods. Again, without loss of generality, we set  =0and the consumer demand
for card goods becomes
 = 
−
The cost borne by each merchant is given in the bottom row of (5).
In Stage II, each merchant  ( =1 2)t a k e s− as given and chooses output
level  to solve
max

 =  − ( + ) =
£
( + −)
− −  − 
¤
 (19)








=  + 
In a symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium  =  for each merchant . Therefore, the total













where the superscript “ﬁx” denotes for ﬁxed per-transaction card fees.
In Stage I, the card network takes the merchant equilibrium (20) as given and chooses

















































































In view of consumers’ utility function (1) and (2), equilibrium consumer utility is









































Finally, note that Result 1 for the proportional card fee case applies also to the ﬁxed
per-transaction fee case, and will therefore not be repeated here. To see this note that
equations (23)—(28) imply that Π




+  0    0 and   0.
5 Comparing Proportional and Fixed Card Fees
We now approach our main investigation which is to explain why card networks impose
proportional fees rather than ﬁxed per-transaction fees.
Result 2.
(a) The card network earns higher proﬁts by charging proportional fees compared with
ﬁxed per-transaction fees. Formally, Π
  Π
 .
(b) An increase in the number of competing merchants decreases the card network’s
gains from using proportional fees relative to ﬁxed per-transaction fees. Formally, Π
 −
Π
 decreases with the number of merchants .
12Proof. (a) Equations (13) and (23) imply Π
 − Π
  0;( b )F o l l o w sf r o m( a )b y
computing (Π
 − Π
 )  0.
Result 2(a) explains why card networks prefer proportional fees to ﬁxed per-transaction
fees, and 2(b) suggests that card networks’ incentive to use proportional fees increases with
the concentration of merchant markets. These results constitute the main motivation for
this research. We now investigate how the two types of card fees aﬀe c tm e r c h a n tp r o ﬁts,
consumer utility and social welfare.
Result 3.
(a) Merchants earn lower proﬁts under proportional card fees compared with ﬁxed per-
transaction fees. Formally Π
  Π
 .
(b) For a suﬃciently large number of competing merchants, a further increase of mer-
chant competition decreases the diﬀerence of merchant proﬁts under proportional fees and
ﬁxed per-transaction fees. Formally, there exists 




decreases with the number of merchants .
Proof. (a) Equations (15) and (25) imply Π
 − Π
  0;( b )F o l l o w sf r o m( a )b y
computing (Π
 −Π
)  0 for 








 = (1 − )(
∗ + 
∗ −  − )
Result 3(a) explains why merchant associations complain about proportional fees and
lobby for ﬁxed per-transaction fees. Result 3(b) suggests that merchants’ incentives to
lobby for ﬁxed per-transaction fees tend to increase with market concentration.
Results 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 3. The ﬁgure shows that the card network
earns a higher proﬁt under proportional fees compared with ﬁxed per-transaction fees,
but merchants earn lower proﬁts. As the number of competing merchants increases,
card network proﬁt increases and merchant proﬁts decrease under both types of fees. In
addition, for both the card network and merchants, the diﬀerence in proﬁts between the
two types of fees decreases with the number of merchants.
13Figure 3: Card network and merchant proﬁts under proportional and ﬁxed fees
Next, Result 4 provides welfare comparisons between proportional fees and ﬁxed per-
transaction fees.
Result 4.
(a) The sum of card network and merchant proﬁts is higher under proportional card





(b) The equilibrium price is lower and total merchant output is higher under propor-
tional fees. Formally,    and   .
(c) Consumer utility is higher under proportional fees. Formally,   .
(d) Social welfare is higher under proportional fees. Formally,   
(e) The above diﬀerences between proportional fees and ﬁxed per-transaction fees di-




+  − ,
 − ,  −  and  −  all decrease with the number of merchants .
Proof. (a) Follows (16) and (26). (b) Follows (14) and (24). (c) Follows (17) and (27). (d)





14Figure 4: Proﬁt and utility diﬀerences between proportional and ﬁxed fees
( − )  0 ( − )  0 ( − )  0 and ( −
)  0
Result 4 shows that the equilibrium market allocation under proportional fees gener-
ates a higher sum of card network and merchant proﬁts and also generates higher consumer
utility and social welfare compared with ﬁxed per-transaction fees. Also, these diﬀerences
diminish with the degree of competition among merchants, as illustrated in Figure 4. Fi-
nally, the following Result 5 shows that there is no diﬀerence between proportional fees
and ﬁxed per-transaction fees when the merchant market is perfectly competitive.
Result 5.
When the merchant market is perfectly competitive, proportional fees and ﬁxed per-









+  − ,  − ,  −  and  −  a l lc o n v e r g et oz e r oa st h e
number of merchants  goes to inﬁnity.









+)=0  lim→∞( − )=0 ,
lim→∞( − )=0 , lim→∞( − )=0and lim→∞( − )=0 
Intuitively, our ﬁndings can be explained as follows. When the merchant market is
monopolized ( =1 ), there are two monopolies in the vertical card payment system,
the card network being the upstream monopoly and the merchant being the downstream
monopoly. They both charge a markup over marginal cost, which causes the “double
marginalization” problem. As it turns out, in the presence of double marginalization, the
upstream monopoly can better restrain the market power of the downstream monopoly
by charging proportional fees. As a result, the card network earns a higher proﬁta tt h e
expense of the merchant under proportional fees. Also, the sum of card network and
merchant proﬁts, consumer utility and social welfare are all higher than those under ﬁxed
per-transaction fees.
As the number of merchants  increases, the downstream merchant market becomes
more competitive, which mitigates the double marginalization problem. Consequently,
under both types of fees, the sum of proﬁts of upstream and downstream ﬁr m sa sw e l l
as consumer utility and social welfare all increase. However, the diﬀerences between pro-
portional fees and ﬁxed per-transaction fees diminish. Ultimately, the diﬀerences vanish
as the number of merchants goes to inﬁnity because the double marginalization problem
gets eliminated.
6C a r d A n n u a l F e e s
A natural extension of our analysis would be to incorporate card annual fees into the
model. Some payment cards require cardholders to pay a lump-sum annual fee. In our
framework, the annual fee could be viewed as a “two-part tariﬀ” that card service providers
use in order to extract a higher surplus from cardholders.
First, note that in the absence of card services, consumers’ utility function (1) and (2)
16imply that consumers spend all their income on cash goods and gain utility  = .I n
contrast, the availability of card services allows consumers to achieve a higher utility level.
In theory, a monopoly card service provider should be able to extract the entire consumer
surplus from card usage by charging cardholders a lump-sum annual fee. Incorporating
card annual fees into the model implies that the card network would then maximize its
overall proﬁts, which is the sum of proﬁts generated from merchant fees and cardholder
annual fees. As before, the merchant fee could be either proportional to the transaction
value or a ﬁxed per-transaction fee, whereas the cardholder annual fee is intended to
capture the remaining consumer surplus from card usage.
Extending our model to allowing the card network to charge cardholders annual fees
yields the following results regarding the comparisons of proportional fees and ﬁxed per-
transaction fees: (a) Merchants earn lower proﬁts under proportional fees than under ﬁxed
per-transaction fees. (b) For a suﬃciently large card service cost ,t h ec a r dn e t w o r k ’ s
overall proﬁts as well as social welfare are higher under proportional fees. (c) The market
outcomes under proportional fees and under ﬁxed per-transaction fees both converge to
the socially eﬃcient allocation as the number of merchants becomes large.
Finally, it should be noted that the card annual fee would be reduced from the
monopoly level if card service providers were subjected to competition. For example,
incumbent card service providers may want to keep their annual fees low in order to
maintain their cardholder base and deter entry from potential competitors.
7 Additional Discussions
This paper explains why payment card networks charge fees that are proportional to the
transaction values instead of charging ﬁxed per-transaction fees. The theory shows that,
when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks earn higher
proﬁts by charging proportional fees. Merchants earn lower proﬁts under proportional
fees whereas consumer utility and social welfare are higher. These ﬁndings explain the
17existing payment card fee structure and shed light on related policy debates.
Our analysis shows that card networks with market power charge a markup over
marginal cost, so the resulting market allocation may deviate from the social optimum.
This concerns policymakers in many countries, who try to align payment card fees with
the cost basis. While it may be diﬃcult to directly regulate card fee levels, it seems
natural and easy to regulate card fee structures, such as requiring ﬁxed per-transaction
fees for payment cards that incur only a ﬁxed cost per transaction (e.g., debit cards
and prepaid cards). However, our analysis suggests that if card networks have market
power and merchants are perfectly competitive, then imposing a ﬁxed per-transaction
f e eo n l yw o u l dn o ta ﬀect the market outcome. Moreover, when merchants also have
market power, a regulation like this may indeed increase merchant proﬁt sb u ta tt h e
expense of card networks and consumers, and is also likely to reduce total social welfare.
Therefore, caution should be taken by policymakers who consider intervening in payment
card markets.14
It should be noted that our analysis has abstracted from the argument whether card
fees fulﬁll a special balancing purpose in two-sided markets because we believe that our
ﬁndings should be useful to all researchers, those who believe that card fees play such a
role, and those who argue that they don’t and that all fees should be cost based.
While the paper studies the payment card industry, our analysis makes more general
contribution to the broader industrial organization literature by studying the eﬀects of
pricing structures in vertically related industries, and by considering two-sided markets.
Some of our results may also shed light on general public ﬁnance taxation issues, such as
the eﬃciency of proportional tax versus ﬂat tax.
14See Wang (2010b) for more discussions on regulating card fee structures versus fee levels.
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